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RETOOLING GENERAL MOTORS:
DEFENDING AN INNOVATIVE USE OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE TO SAVE AMERICA’S
AUTO INDUSTRY
Joseph H. Smolinsky*
INTRODUCTION
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man
stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit
belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust
and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again
and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming[.]
President Theodore Roosevelt 1

The “bailout” of General Motors Corporation (GM) has been criticized
in many circles as the pursuit of a socialist agenda, the perpetuation of an
ongoing problem of moral hazard, or simply an example of a bad business
blunder that would never be replicated in the private sector. But, as this
Article will point out, it was none of those things.
The significance of GM to the U.S. economy cannot be overstated.
Liquidation would have meant almost certain devastation to many segments
of the economy. Economists, with the benefit of hindsight, have confirmed
the obvious: the cost of the restructuring to taxpayers has been fairly
modest when compared to the alternative of inaction. And with the help of
more stable capital markets, the newly created General Motors Company is
now back in public hands, beyond the need for taxpayer support.
Aside from the direct economic ramifications at stake, the failure of
GM—perhaps the most iconic representation of American manufacturing—
could have destroyed the national psyche and consumer confidence at a
critical time in the 2008–2009 financial crisis. A government takeover of
GM in the traditional sense could have been equally damaging. Therefore,
the manner in which the U.S. government stepped in was equally important
to the decision to do so.
The rescue of GM and Chrysler LLC (Chrysler) was most stunning in
its use of traditional Chapter 11 procedures. There was no seizing of assets
by the U.S. government under principles of nationalization or eminent
*
Joseph H. Smolinsky is a member of the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. The
firm served as general bankruptcy counsel for General Motors Corporation. The views expressed
in this Article represent the views of the author and not Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. This
Article would not be possible without the substantial assistance of Saima Majid, Conray C. Tseng,
and Pablo Falabella.
1. President Theodore Roosevelt, Address at the Sorbonne in Paris, France, The Man in the
Arena: Citizenship in a Republic (Apr. 23, 1910).
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domain. There was no bailout involving direct payments to creditors or
financial grants typically associated with creating moral hazard. Despite the
media frenzy and public outcry from parochial interests claiming cronyism
and backroom politics, the auto restructurings were very much like the
routine Chapter 11 cases that insolvency professionals handle on a daily
basis. Ultimately, the parties involved conducted the sale transactions at the
center of the restructurings with the utmost transparency and afforded all
possible and available due process to affected parties.
It is certainly true that GM’s bankruptcy led to limited recoveries for
various constituencies. And the GM bankruptcy case, more than others,
exposed the plight of thousands of retirees, stockholders, and product
liability claimants that the bankruptcy hit particularly hard.2 But the GM
bankruptcy achieved results vastly better than the alternatives and, despite
assertions of favoritism, provided all creditors with distributions consistent
with the priority scheme established by Congress under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.3 This Article will explore some of the criticisms leveled
against the GM Chapter 11 process.
In the final analysis, the executive branch, acting through the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (the U.S. Treasury), bravely stepped out of its
comfort zone to lead an effort to grant GM and Chrysler fresh starts by
using traditional Chapter 11 tools. These transactions were unprecedented,
and success was in no way assured. Yet the Bankruptcy Code provided a
legislative framework and judicial oversight that was tangible and against
which the U.S. government’s actions could be evaluated.
I. THE GENERAL MOTORS STORY
We’ve got to go back to making things.
President Barack H. Obama4

A. THE FOUNDING AND IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL MOTORS TO THE
NATION’S ECONOMY
Founded in 1908 by William C. Durant, GM revolutionized the
automotive market by adopting the groundbreaking strategy of “[a] car for
every purse and purpose.”5 This strategy divided the automotive market into
distinct price segments, from low-priced to luxury automobiles, and led GM
to become one company growing through the creation and management of
multiple brands. Throughout its history, GM produced some of the most

2. See, e.g., Mike Spector, Car Bailouts Left Behind Crash Victims, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2011, at A1.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1146 (2006).
4. President Barack H. Obama, Address at Solyndra, Inc. in Fremond, California (May 26,
2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-201000420.pdf.
5. GEN. MOTORS CORP., SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1925).
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striking and memorable automotive designs, including the Chevrolet
Corvette, Buick Riviera, and Cadillac Eldorado. For many years, GM
supplied one in five vehicles driven in the United States.6 Its “highly-skilled
engineering and development personnel [even] designed and manufactured .
. . the first lunar roving vehicle driven on the moon.”7
But it is neither the historical nor sentimental significance of GM that
caused the U.S. and Canadian governments to jump to its aid in the tail end
of 2008. At the time of the filing, GM was the largest U.S. automobile
manufacturer and the second-largest automobile manufacturer in the world,
with a reach across the U.S. and global economies. As of March 31, 2009,
its consolidated global assets and liabilities totaled approximately $82.3
billion and $172.8 billion, respectively, and it reported global revenues of
approximately $150 billion for the 2008 fiscal year.8 Also, as of March 31,
2009, GM employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide, of
whom approximately 91,000 were residents of the United States.9
GM relied not only upon its direct salaried and hourly employees but
also upon the thousands of suppliers that, in turn, count on GM for their
survival. These suppliers include a myriad of indirect suppliers (not Tier I
part suppliers) such as advertising agencies and financial consulting and
other service providers that supported GM’s operations. Each of these
suppliers hired employees dedicated to the automotive industry. One
quickly realizes the severe adverse impact that would occur to the U.S.
economy if GM were to shut down operations. A contemporaneous
liquidation of the even more financially precarious Chrysler could have
exacerbated the effects on the U.S. work force in a worst case scenario. In
fact, it is said that one in ten Americans, directly or indirectly, receives a
paycheck from the automobile industry.10
GM and its suppliers existed in a symbiotic relationship: each depended
on the other for survival. In North America, GM relied upon approximately

6. Affidavit of Fredrick A. Henderson Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 ¶ 20, In re
Motors Liquidation Co., 2011 WL 3805896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (ECF No. 21)
[hereinafter Henderson Affidavit]. Unless otherwise specified, all court document docket numbers
contained herein are in reference to In re Motors Liquidation Co. (f/k/a Gen. Motors Corp.), 2011
WL 3805896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (No. 09-50026), available at http://www.motorsliq
uidationdocket.com/maincase.php3.
7. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 20.
8. Gen. Motors Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 2 (May 8, 2009).
9. Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), and 507,
(I) Authorizing Debtors to (a) Pay Certain Employee Compensation and Benefits and (b) Maintain
and Continue Such Benefits and Other Employee-Related Programs and (II) Directing Banks to
Honor Prepetition Checks for Payment of Prepetition Employee Obligations (ECF No. 33);
Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 23.
10. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 48; SEAN P. MCALINDEN, KIM HILL, BERNARD
SWIECKI, ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY–
AN UPDATE: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, 34
(Economics and Business Group Center for Automotive Research, Fall 2003).
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11,500 suppliers.11 For over 600 of such suppliers, including industry
“heavyweights” such as Delphi Corporation, GM represented 30 percent or
more of their annual revenues.12 In the years leading up to GM’s bankruptcy
filing, GM made vendor payments totaling approximately $50 billion
annually.13 Operating on a “just-in-time” inventory management model,
GM typically assembles component parts from numerous suppliers into
vehicles within a few hours of delivery to GM’s assembly facilities.14 While
providing GM significant cost savings by reducing inventory expense,
“just-in-time” manufacturing has one potentially fatal flaw—if one of the
thousands of component parts is not timely delivered, the entire production
line quickly grinds to a halt. Additionally, an overnight loss of a customer
like GM could threaten the existence of a highly leveraged direct (Tier I)
supplier. Because such suppliers also provided parts for Ford, Chrysler, and
other original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), a GM shutdown could
threaten the entire U.S. automotive industry.
B. THE EVENTS LEADING TO GENERAL MOTORS’ BANKRUPTCY
With an upside down balance sheet and ever increasing retiree costs and
other long-term obligations, GM needed to restructure its operations and
finances. The “Great Recession,” which began in the second half of 2007,
was the triggering event that forced GM to come to terms with its issues
and address them in a meaningful manner. GM had already been
experiencing a downward trend in sales as GM’s U.S. market share (the
largest single market for GM’s products) steadily declined from 45 percent
in 1980 to 22 percent in 2008.15 This drop was due, in large part, to the fact
that foreign OEMs (with lower cost structures and legacy benefit
obligations) entered the market with cheaper alternatives to GM vehicles.16
In recent years, the loss of market share had accelerated. In the fourth
quarter of 2008, for example, GM’s domestic automobile sales decreased
by 36 percent compared to the corresponding period in 2007.17 For the first
quarter of 2009, GM’s domestic automobile sales plummeted by 49 percent
compared to the corresponding period in 2008.18 The combination of
sharply declining sales and enormously burdensome fixed costs opened a
spigot of red ink.
By the fall of 2008, GM was in the midst of a severe liquidity crisis,
and its ability to continue operations grew increasingly uncertain. GM

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 10.
See id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
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previously had recognized the need to transform its operations and balance
sheet to create a leaner, more efficient, and more profitable business.
Unfortunately, because of the continuing and deepening recession,
aggravated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on September
15, 2008, GM was not able to achieve its objective.
These exigent economic circumstances compelled GM to seek financial
assistance from the U.S. government to sustain its operations. Both sides of
the aisle in Congress took seriously the dire warnings that assistance was
necessary to avoid a potentially fatal systemic failure throughout the
domestic automotive industry, and the concomitant harm to the overall U.S.
economy from the loss of hundreds of thousands to potentially millions of
jobs. What faced the nation was not an isolated request for charity but the
threat of a sequential shutdown of GM and hundreds of ancillary
businesses.
1. Viability Plan I—Too Little, Too Late
On November 21, 2008, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Nancy Pelosi, and the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, released a letter
to the chief executive officers of GM, Chrysler, and Ford Motor Company,
outlining the requirements for the domestic OEMs to request government
loans, including the submission of additional information demonstrating
future economic viability.19
In response, on December 2, 2008, GM submitted to the Senate
Banking Committee and the House of Representatives Financial Services
Committee a proposed viability plan (Viability Plan I), pursuant to which
GM committed to using “[g]overnment funding to exclusively sustain and
restructure its operations in the United States and aggressively retool its
product mix.”20 In Viability Plan I, GM requested an immediate loan of $4
billion to ensure minimum liquidity through the end of 2008, a second $4
billion draw in January 2009, a third draw of $2 billion in February 2009,
and a fourth draw of $2 billion at an unstated date in 2009, under an
aggregate loan facility of $12 billion.21 In addition, GM sought access to an
incremental $6 billion line of credit, for a total of $18 billion in requested
government loans.22 “Notwithstanding the critical need for emergency
funding by domestic OEMs, Congress did not act on the request, and GM
was compelled to seek immediate financial support from the U.S. Treasury
to avoid the suspension of operations.”23
19. Letter from Pelosi, Reid to Auto Makers on Terms, BLOGS.WSJ.COM (Nov. 21, 2008, 5:44
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/autoshow/2008/11/21/letter-form-pelosi-reid-to-auto-makers-on-terms/.
20. Gen. Motors Corp., Restructuring Plan for Long-Term Viability, Dec. 2, 2008, at 4
[hereinafter Viability Plan I].
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 53.
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2. A Helping Hand from the U.S. Treasury
On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced that the
outgoing administration would make short-term, emergency funding
available to GM and Chrysler under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP)24 to prevent both companies from commencing immediate
bankruptcy cases and potentially becoming subject to a fire-sale liquidation.
“On December 31, 2008, GM and the U.S. Treasury entered into an
agreement . . . that provided GM with emergency financing of up to an
initial $13.4 billion pursuant to a secured term loan facility.”25 On the same
day, GM accessed the facility and borrowed $4 billion from the U.S.
Treasury.26 GM would borrow an additional $5.4 billion on January 21,
2009 and the remaining $4 billion on February 17, 2009.27 In addition, on
April 29, 2009, the Canadian and Ontario governments, through the Export
Development Canada (the Canadian EDC)28 provided bridge financing to
GM in the form of a three-year C$3 billion term loan.29 By the time GM
would enter bankruptcy, GM would have drawn down approximately $400
million on the facility.30
3. Viability Plan II—Back to the Drawing Board
Like the congressional mandate, the U.S. Treasury facility required GM
to develop a plan to transform its business and demonstrate future viability.
But subsequent to December 2, 2008, when GM submitted Viability Plan I,
the continued decline of global economic conditions, when combined with
public speculation about GM’s future and survival, further reduced GM’s
sales, volume, revenue, and cash flow. GM was on the brink of a downward
death spiral.
In February 2009, President Obama formed the Presidential Task Force
on the Auto Industry, which included cabinet level officials, to evaluate
available options (the Automotive Task Force).31 Also assembled was a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2006).
Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 54.
Id.
Id.
The Canadian EDC is Canada’s government-owned export credit agency that provides
financing, insurance, and risk management to Canadian exporters and investors. Id. ¶ 117.
29. Id.
30. Id. ¶ 118.
31. The members of the Automotive Task Force were: the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner; the Director of the National Economic Council, Lawrence H.
Summers; the secretaries of Transportation, Commerce, Labor, and Energy; the Chair of the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator; and the Director of the White House Office
of Energy and Climate Change. Press Release, the White House, Geithner, Summers Convene
Official Designees to Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry (Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/geithner-summers-convene-official-designees-presi
dential-task-force-auto-industry [hereinafter Task Force Designee Press Release].

2011]

Retooling General Motors

109

team of savvy restructuring and legal professionals (Team Auto) that was
responsible for managing the day-to-day restructuring initiatives and
negotiations.32
On February 17, 2009, GM submitted a greatly revised business plan
designed to achieve and sustain GM’s long-term viability, international
competitiveness, and energy efficiency (Viability Plan II).33 Viability
Plan II attempted to address improvement to GM’s revenues, costs, and
balance sheet for its U.S. and foreign operations, as well as GM’s plan to
reduce petroleum dependency and greenhouse gas emissions.
Although GM proposed to close fourteen plants and decrease its global
work force by 47,000 (including 10,000 white-collar workers), GM’s initial
proposal failed to sufficiently overhaul its operations.34 The initial plan did
not provide for mandated labor concessions and benefits modifications or
overall reduction of GM bond obligations.35 More importantly, the proposal
premised GM’s continued survival on tenuous, optimistic assumptions,
which, if GM missed, could easily return it to financial distress.36 For
example, if GM missed its projected share of overall global sales by 1
percent, GM would suffer a $2 billion cash flow reduction.37
On March 30, 2009, President Obama announced that Viability Plan II
failed to provide a means for GM “not only to survive, but succeed in this
competitive global market.”38 President Obama outlined a series of actions
that GM needed to take to receive additional federal assistance, including
reaching an agreement with its unions regarding labor and legacy
obligations, and with its bondholders regarding debt reduction, as well as
submitting a revised business plan that was more aggressive in terms of
scope and timing.39
President Obama indicated that the U.S. Treasury would extend
additional secured financing for working capital for a period of another
sixty days, during which GM would need to negotiate, develop, and
implement a more aggressive and comprehensive viability plan.40 GM
32. The name “Team Auto” was coined by Steven L. Rattner. Team Auto included, among
others, Ron Bloom, Steven L. Rattner, Harry Wilson, and Matthew A. Feldman. Both Wilson and
Feldman had extensive restructuring backgrounds and were the lead negotiators for Team Auto.
Wilson was a partner at Silver Point Capital, a well-known hedge fund in the restructuring arena,
and Feldman was a senior restructuring partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. Id.
33. Gen. Motors Corp., 2009–2014 Restructuring Plan, Feb. 17, 2009 [hereinafter Viability
Plan II].
34. Id. at 13, 23.
35. Viability Plan I, supra note 20.
36. See Declaration of Harry Wilson, Ex. B, 3–5 (ECF No. 2577) (Determination of Viability
Summary General Motors Corporation) [hereinafter Wilson Declaration].
37. Id. at 4.
38. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on the American Automotive Industry (Mar. 30,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-americanautomotive-industry-33009).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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would inevitably borrow an additional $4 billion from the U.S. Treasury.
President Obama stated publicly for the first time in March 2009 that GM
needed a fresh start to implement such a plan and suggested that the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code could be used as a mechanism to help the company
restructure quickly and emerge stronger.41 President Obama set a deadline
of June 1, 2009 for GM to demonstrate that its viability plan would
fundamentally transform GM’s operations into a profitable and competitive
American car company.42
By this time, GM realized that token cost saving measures would not be
acceptable, and future government assistance would not be an open-ended
bailout, but rather, would be dependent on a substantial reduction in debt.
Specifically, the Automotive Task Force required GM to “substantially
reduce GM’s outstanding debt and existing liabilities to a level where they
[were] consistent with both its normalized cash flow and the cyclical nature
of its business.”43 The only way to accomplish this outside of bankruptcy
would be a voluntary exchange of the company’s public debt for equity. On
April 27, 2009, GM launched an out-of-court restructuring through a public
exchange offer, which would have substantially reduced GM’s $27 billion
in long-term obligations.44 The exchange offer would have consolidated
GM’s obligations to the U.S. Treasury and was conditioned on reducing
retiree benefits by $10 billion.45 The exchange offer, however, failed to
garner sufficient support from GM bondholders.
GM was now out of options. The company was simply too large to
attract a private purchaser or new lending source. But management, now
without CEO Rick Wagoner, who resigned on March 29, 200946 amid
pressure from the U.S. government, was doubtful that GM could survive a
protracted Chapter 11 case.47
4. Planning the 363 Transaction—Daring to Whisper the “B”
Word
Out of options to complete an out-of-court restructuring, GM and Team
Auto began seriously discussing the bankruptcy alternatives. Because the
U.S. Treasury was not prepared to fund a long-term debtor-in-possession
financing package while the parties negotiated the future of GM in a “free
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36 (Obama Administration New Path to Viability for GM
& Chrysler, Detailed Findings on GM and Chrysler Plans).
44. See Gen. Motors Corp., Tender Offer Statement (Sch. to Rule 14d-10) (Apr. 27, 2009);
Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 71.
45. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 72.
46. Gen. Motors Corp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Apr. 2, 2009).
47. Viability Plan II, supra note 33, at 34 (“The Company remains convinced bankruptcy
would be protracted with a significant possibility that exit would not be achieved.”).
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fall” bankruptcy, a deal structure was necessary to extract GM’s business
and operating assets from bankruptcy as quickly as possible. A
“prepackaged” Chapter 11 case with pre-filing solicitation of creditors
could be concluded quickly with creditor support but likely would have met
the same fate as the failed exchange offer. Moreover, a “prepackaged”
Chapter 11 case would have limited GM’s ability to reject contracts and
shutter non-core operations, thus failing to achieve the goals set by the
Automotive Task Force.
No one had a true level of confidence that GM could have sustained
even its severely weakened sales levels during an expedited plan process.
GM and the restructuring professionals on Team Auto came to realize that,
under the circumstances, an expedited sale of substantially all of GM’s
operating assets was the only reasonable course of action. Given the
amounts that the U.S. Treasury and Canadian EDC had lent, and would be
lending as a first priority loan, a credit bid of the debt for the assets and a
portion of the equity of the newly formed company, coupled with cash to
fund a wind-down of the estate left behind, would constitute a formidable
and appropriate stalking-horse bid to acquire GM’s assets and operations.
With new leadership in place following Rick Wagoner’s departure, GM
was open to utilizing the bankruptcy laws to implement a transaction under
which substantially all of GM’s operational assets would be sold, subject to
any higher or better offers, in an expedited process under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a debtor
to use, sell, or lease property of the debtor’s estate outside the ordinary
course of its business, subject to notice and a hearing.48
The U.S. and Canadian governments began designing the framework of
a sale (the 363 Transaction) whereby they would contribute their notes
representing billions of dollars of secured loans to a newly formed U.S.
Treasury-sponsored entity that would later become the new General Motors
Company (the Purchaser or New GM), which, in turn, would credit bid the
debt to acquire GM’s operating assets. The Purchaser would assume certain
specified liabilities that were necessary to preserve the going-concern value
of the enterprise and create a “New GM” free of virtually all entanglement
with bankruptcy. Any unprofitable or non-core assets would remain with
GM’s bankruptcy estate (Old GM) which would be disposed of by Old GM
in an orderly fashion. This stratagem was groundbreaking in that just a few
weeks earlier, Rick Wagoner reportedly announced publicly that
bankruptcy for GM was not a viable option as “no one would buy a car
from a bankrupt company.”49

48. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006).
49. Alison Fitzgerald & Julianna Goldman, Obama Saving GM Needed Dealmaker Team to
Break It (Update2), BLOOMBERG, June 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=alvxAe73XHbM.
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The proposed 363 Transaction would not only address GM’s debt
obligations but would also significantly restructure its future legacy
obligations to its employees through a settlement with the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW)—the labor union that represented the largest
portion of GM’s U.S. unionized employees.50 Resolution of the legacy
retirement benefit issues and work rules for a refocused employer was a
gating issue. Concessions were necessary to clean up the balance sheet and
ensure future viability. Yet, as described in more detail below, the
Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that limit a debtor’s ability to modify
retiree benefits and collective bargaining agreements without protracted
negotiations and possible litigation that, in this case, would have
jeopardized an expeditious exit from bankruptcy for the operating assets.51
A consensual deal with the UAW would be critical.
With the structure now set, Team Auto, with input from the U.S.
Treasury, the Automotive Task Force, and the Canadian EDC, fully
negotiated the Master Sale and Purchase Agreement and completed its due
diligence on the assets to be acquired and contracts to be assigned to the
Purchaser. Simultaneously, GM, with significant assistance from Team
Auto, negotiated a settlement and an amended collective bargaining
agreement that contained significant cash and non-cash concessions from
the UAW in exchange for, among other things, a 17.5 percent stake in New
GM common stock.52

50. See infra text accompanying note 110.
51. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114.
52. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Under the 363 Transaction, the equity of the Purchaser (i.e., New GM)
would be distributed initially as follows53:

U.S. Treasury
Canadian EDC
UAW’s new
voluntary
employee
beneficiary
association trust

Old GM

New Common
Stock
60.8%
11.7%
17.5%

Series A
Preferred Stock
$2.1 billion
$400 million
$6.5 billion

10%, plus up to
an additional 2%
of New GM
common stock if
general
unsecured
claims exceed
$35 billion

Warrants

6-year warrants
to acquire 2.5%
of New GM
common stock
with an exercise
price based on
$75 billion total
equity value
Two sets of
warrants, each to
acquire 7.5% of
outstanding New
GM common
stock with an
exercise price of
$15 billion and
$30 billion total
equity value

As proposed, the 363 Transaction would preserve the value of GM as
an operating enterprise (i.e., going-concern value, not mere liquidation);
avoid the domino effect upon other OEMs and Tier I suppliers that would
follow a GM liquidation; continue employment for hundreds of thousands
of persons at GM, as well as employees of those employers who rely upon
GM; protect the many communities dependent on the continuation of the
business; restore consumer confidence in GM and its products and dealers;
and establish an automotive manufacturing business that would be viable,
competitive, and reliable, as well as a standard bearer and bellwether
industry considered essential for the United States.
C. THE GENERAL MOTORS BANKRUPTCY
In the face of this crisis, which threatened the liquidation of not only
GM but also the automobile industry of the United States, GM filed for
bankruptcy protection on June 1, 2009, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the

53. Id. at 482–83.
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Southern District of New York (the Bankruptcy Court) under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.54
1. Implementing the 363 Transaction
GM concurrently filed, with its voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief,
a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting approval of the 363
Transaction, under which the debtors would sell their operating assets to the
Purchaser in exchange for a package of cash and non-cash consideration
valued at over $90 billion, subject to any higher or better offers.55 On
June 2, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing, approved
notice and other related procedures and set June 19, 2009 as the deadline for
parties to object to the proposed transaction, June 22, 2009 as the deadline
to submit any higher or better bids, and June 30, 2009 as the date for a
hearing to consider approval of the transaction and opposition thereto.56
Although opposing parties filed hundreds of objections to the 363
Transaction, GM received neither any meaningful bids nor any other
alternative proposals to the 363 Transaction. Notably, no objector argued
that the 363 Transaction was not in GM’s best interests. The evidentiary
record in this regard was undisputed. As the Bankruptcy Court found, “the
only alternative to an immediate sale [was] liquidation,” in which case
unsecured creditors would recover nothing and secured creditors would
receive only a portion of their claim.57 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court
found that the U.S. Treasury, with the support of the Canadian EDC, was
the only entity prepared to finance the Chapter 11 cases, and such financing
was conditioned on the satisfaction of certain milestones for completion of
the sale transaction.58
On July 5, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued a decision and order
overruling all remaining objections, and authorized the 363 Transaction.
The sale of GM’s continuing business closed on July 10, 2009.59 On the

54. Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 (ECF No. 1).
55. Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363(b), (f), (k), and (m), and 365 and Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, and 6006, to (I) Approve (A) the Sale Pursuant to the Master Sale and
Purchase Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-Sponsored
Purchaser, Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests; (B) the
Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (C) Other
Relief; and (II) Scheduling Sale Approval Hearing (ECF No. 92).
56. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363, and 365 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, and
6006 (I) Approving Procedures for Sale of Debtors’ Assets Pursuant to Master Sale and Purchase
Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-Sponsored Purchaser;
(II) Scheduling Bid Deadline and Sale Hearing Date; (III) Establishing Assumption and
Assignment Procedures; and (IV) Fixing Notice Procedures and Approving Form of Notice (ECF
No. 274).
57. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 474, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58. Id. at 480.
59. Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 31 (ECF No. 8023)
[hereinafter Disclosure Statement].
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closing date, the Purchaser took on the name General Motors Company
(i.e., New GM), and the entity formerly known as General Motors
Corporation changed its name to Motors Liquidation Company.60 Less than
eighteen months later, in November 2010, New GM conducted an initial
public offering of stock held by the U.S. Treasury and Canadian EDC and
returned to the big board of the New York Stock Exchange.61
2. “Old” General Motors and the Wind-Down Process
Motors Liquidation Company remained in Chapter 11 following the
sale to manage the wind-down of the remaining assets, as well as the
resolution of all remaining claims against it (i.e., all liabilities not assumed
by New GM). These claims included many types of general unsecured
claims (e.g., breach of contract and rejection damage claims, personal injury
and product liability tort claims, off-site environmental liabilities, etc.) and
certain secured, administrative, and priority claims. To fund the
administration of Old GM’s wind-down and ensure that the 363 Transaction
sale consideration, in the form of stock and warrants, would be available for
Old GM’s general unsecured creditors, the U.S. Treasury and Canadian
EDC agreed to provide $1.175 billion in secured post-petition financing.62
This financing would be used for, among other things, the cleanup and
maintenance of remaining real estate holdings.
To establish the potential universe of liabilities, Motors Liquidation
Company filed with the Bankruptcy Court its schedules of assets and
liabilities, on which it listed all the obligations that it believed it owed to its
creditors.63 To the extent a creditor disagreed with the amounts set forth on
the schedules, it was required to file a proof of claim establishing the basis
of such claim.64 Creditors filed over 80,000 claims with asserted amounts
aggregating more than $246 billion.
The make-up of remaining creditors of Old GM was unique. In a typical
large Chapter 11 case, creditors include trade vendors, contract
counterparties, and financial institutions holding long-term debt. In this
case, many of Old GM’s creditors were ordinary Americans—for example,
60.
61.
62.
63.

Amended Notice of Change of Case Caption, (ECF No. 3106).
Gen. Motors Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 18, 2010).
Disclosure Statement, supra note 59, at 28.
See Statement of Financial Affairs for Motors Liquidation Co. (f/k/a General Motors
Corp.) (ECF No. 4060-78); see also Notice of Filing of Amendment to Motors Liquidation Co.’s
Schedules of Assets and Liabilities (ECF No. 4161); see also Schedules of Assets and Liabilities
for Remediation and Liability Management Company, Inc. (ECF No. 4244-47).
64. See Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule
3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim (Including Claims under
Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)) and Procedures Relating Thereto and Approving the Form
and Manner of Notice Thereof (ECF No. 4079); See also Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs
of Claim (Including Claims under Bankruptcy Rule 503(b)(9)) and Procedures Relating Thereto
and Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof (ECF No. 4586).
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middle class Americans who counted on GM as a blue chip haven for their
most precious retirement savings.
Additionally, like every other major automotive manufacturer, GM
faced thousands of lawsuits at any given time for alleged product defects
resulting in road accidents. The size and breadth of GM, however, permitted
it to accept significant risk for general liability exposure. It was self-insured
for personal injury and most product liability claims up to $35 million per
claim. The lack of third-party insurance meant that these claimants, who
had already suffered tragic losses, would be treated as any other creditor of
GM and receive cents on the dollar.65
To ease the burden of the claims reconciliation process, Old GM
established omnibus claims objection and settlement procedures consistent
with those used in other large Chapter 11 cases.66 These procedures
supplemented existing claims resolution procedures set forth in the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to address the unprecedented number of
claims filed.67 Claimants were welcomed to participate in hearings by
telephone, often at Old GM’s cost in the case of individual claimants, which
significantly reduced the burden of participating in the case. The ability to
tell one’s stories of the impact that the GM bankruptcy had had on one’s
life, through letters, pleadings, and arguments to the court, served for many
as a needed cathartic exercise that would not have been available in a
government takeover or other non-judicial process.
Old GM also implemented alternative dispute resolution procedures to
assist in the resolution of claims.68 These procedures established an
informal negotiation period which would be followed by a mediation
conducted by a member of a panel selected by the claimant. As of late 2011,
this process had resulted in the consensual resolution of asserted liabilities
totaling over $10 billion.
As of June 30, 2011, Motors Liquidation Company has objected to
more than 65,000 claims, settled hundreds of claims, and conducted

65. Unlike with the claims of other creditors that could be adjudicated quickly in the
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to estimate or liquidate personal
injury claims. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2006). Thus, claimants holding such claims were faced with
the prospect of prosecuting full trials in other fora before any personal injury claimant would be
able to participate in creditor distributions.
66. See, e.g., Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 9019(b)
Authorizing the Debtors to (I) File Omnibus Claims Objections and (II) Establish Procedures for
Settling Certain Claims (ECF No. 4180).
67. Id.
68. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and General Order M-390 Authorizing
Implementation of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, Including Mandatory Mediation
(ECF No. 5037); Amended Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and General Order M-390
Authorizing Implementation of Alternative Dispute Procedures, Including Mandatory Mediation
(ECF No. 7558).
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numerous mediations, all resulting in a reduction of general unsecured
liabilities to an aggregate maximum of less than $39.5 billion.69
II. CRITICISMS OF THE GM “BAILOUT”
Naysayers of the GM rescue fall into three categories: (1) those who
express a lack of confidence that GM could be run successfully from within
the D.C. Beltway; (2) those who believe that certain constituents (e.g., the
UAW) received beneficial treatment to the detriment of other more
deserving groups; and (3) those who believe that the government had
stepped over constitutional boundaries by providing financial taxpayer
support to, and acquiring the equity of, GM.
A. THE OBAMA MOTOR CO.?
Does anyone really believe that politicians and bureaucrats in Washington can
successfully steer a multi-national corporation to economic viability?
Congressman John Boehner70

In the planning stages of the auto “bailout,” there was tremendous
skepticism that the government could take effective control of GM without
the process becoming a failed political exercise.71 With access to billions of
dollars of taxpayer funds in play, the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive
Task Force wielded extraordinary power to control not only whether GM
and Chrysler could reorganize, but also to dictate how such a reorganization
(or liquidation) would occur and which voting districts would be the net
winners and losers.
In retrospect, a restructuring plan for GM easily could have been
bogged down in debate over a variety of decisions that ultimately would
have significant local impact, such as which plants to close, which vendor
contracts to continue, and which brand names to retire. Critics were on firm
ground in raising concerns about the ability of politicians to sacrifice their
own constituencies for the common good. Yet despite the public nature of
the bankruptcy filing, the restructuring of GM was largely unaffected by
political grandstanding. There were three main reasons for this: the
Automotive Task Force and Team Auto, the use of TARP funds, and the
speed of the transaction.
1. The Automotive Task Force and Team Auto
First and foremost, the organization and utilization of the Automotive
Task Force (and, in particular, of Team Auto) was a well-designed move to
69. Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Quarterly GUC Trust Reports as of June 30,
2011 (ECF No. 10648).
70. Congressman John Boehner, Remarks Regarding the Federal Bail-Out of GM and Chrysler
(June 1, 2009).
71. See, e.g., The Obama Motor Co., WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A11.

118

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

divorce the negotiation of the actual terms of the sale transaction from the
political arena. Team Auto was not the product of partisan politics, but
rather, its members were recruited, in large part, from hedge funds and Wall
Street law firms. These professionals understood distressed investing and
ran the transaction much like they would a private equity deal. The
Automotive Task Force mandated that Team Auto conduct due diligence,
make reasonable business judgments, and fashion a transaction geared more
toward maximizing the value of the reorganized enterprise than fulfilling
noneconomic objectives.72 This is not to say that Team Auto was free from
political pressures.73 Nevertheless, given the momentum and speed of the
transaction and the identity of the negotiators on the front lines, the
restructuring process stayed on track.
Had the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive Task Force been driven by
political concerns, they could have structured the requirements set forth for
the $13.4 billion bridge loan to preserve constituency interests. In contrast,
the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive Task Force took a hard-nosed
approach that required a restructured GM “not only to survive, but to
succeed in this competitive global market[.]”74 In doing so, the Automotive
Task Force created accountability to generate positive cash flow and
maintain a competitive advantage over other OEMs.75 Noticeably absent
from the sale agreement were “pork barrel” conditions or terms
improvidently favoring specific constituencies. As a point of comparison,
the French government conditioned €6.5 billion in loans made to French
automotive manufacturers Peugeot S.A. and Renault S.A. upon no plant
closures or compulsory work force reductions during the five-year terms of
the loans, despite some industry experts suggesting that the French
automotive industry has one-third more jobs and plants than it needs.76
Other European countries have also raised warnings about plant closures by
linking jobs to bailout aid.77 For example, the restructuring of GM’s
European Opel operations became a tug-of-war between Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Spain as each country sought to preserve factories
located in their respective countries irrespective of whether a business case

72. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 60–61.
73. See generally STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT

OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 238–39, 246–47, 262–63
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010).
74. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on the American Automotive Industry 4 (Mar. 30,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-americanautomotive-industry-33009); see also Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 63.
75. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36 (Obama Administration New Path to Viability for GM
& Chrysler, Detailed Findings on GM and Chrysler Plans).
76. John Reed & Anousha Sakoui, Carmaking: A Fork in the Road, FIN. TIMES, Dec.10, 2009,
at 7.
77. Id.
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existed for the continued operation of the factory.78 The GM sale and the
loan transactions generally were free from such conditions.
2. The Use of TARP
The fact that Congress pre-authorized the mechanism by which the U.S.
Treasury would provide funding for the GM bankruptcy and the subsequent
wind-down served, without a doubt, to reduce political interference with
completion of the transaction. One could easily surmise that if the funding
of GM and the sale transaction was put before Congress for approval
independently from TARP, the ensuing debate over the specifics of the
surviving company’s business plan could have either resulted in a larger,
less nimble, and more precarious enterprise, or could have damaged value
simply by bogging down and delaying the transaction to the detriment of
value.
3. The Speed of the Transaction
By the time GM filed its Chapter 11 case on June 1, 2009, GM had
fully negotiated the structure and terms of the sale with the U.S. Treasury.
GM also reached agreements with an ad hoc group of bondholders and the
UAW. The Bankruptcy Court approved the transaction, and the parties
consummated the sale, just thirty-nine days after the commencement of the
Chapter 11 case. The speed at which this case was conducted was not
designed to squelch political opposition, but was necessary for appropriate
business concerns.79
Although the Bankruptcy Court approval process played out publicly,
and was the subject of a three-day evidentiary hearing on the propriety of
the transaction, the speed at which the sale was conducted left little time for
special interest groups to mobilize and exert pressure to modify the terms of
the 363 Transaction. Accordingly, the economic underpinnings of the
restructuring negotiated by Team Auto remained fundamentally unaltered.

78. See Paul Betts, Spain Risks Losing to Germany and UK in Opel Game, FIN. TIMES, Oct.16,
2009, at 16.
79. Harvey R. Miller, a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, stated to the
Bankruptcy Court at the sale hearing:
[I]f there’s going to be a recovery of value for the assets of General Motors, it’s
necessary in an absolute sense that the assets be sold as quickly as possible to a
purchaser who will immediately commence and resume the operations of a new
General Motors. That is the primary objective of these Chapter 11 cases and why
General Motors has elected to proceed pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code
to sell substantially all of its assets.
Transcript of Hearing at 38:18–25 (ECF No. 374).
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B. IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION?
The truth is that the bailouts and bankruptcy processes of GM and Chrysler were
riddled with unethical conduct and blatantly favored the politically
powerful UAW over other classes.
Mark Modica80

Opponents of the 363 Transaction allege that, relative to other creditor
constituencies, the UAW and its membership received a “sweetheart” deal
and obtained better treatment than they were entitled. The deal struck
between New GM and the UAW, however, exemplifies the hardball and
realistic economic approach undertaken by the Automotive Task Force and
Team Auto. The legal requirements of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provided the UAW
with significant leverage and a seat at the table of GM’s restructuring.
Before exploring the details of the UAW negotiations, it is beneficial to
examine the legal framework within which GM and the U.S. government
needed to engage the UAW.
1. Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Bankruptcy
A Chapter 11 debtor may generally either “assume” or “reject” any
executory contract as part of its reorganization process, based on its
assessment of whether the contract provides a benefit to or is necessary for
the company’s reorganization.81 While there is no definition for “executory
contracts” in the Bankruptcy Code, an “executory contract” is typically
viewed as a contract by which the parties owe material obligations to one
another.82 Collective bargaining agreements are considered executory
contracts.
By assumption of a contract, a company assumes all liabilities under the
agreement and the agreement continues forward with the reorganized

80. Mark Modica, Let’s Not Forget Ethical Shortcomings of Auto Bailout, NAT’L LEGAL AND
POLICY CTR. (June 28, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/06/28/ex-car-czar%E2%80
%99s-book-exposes-ethical-shortcomings-gm-bailout.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).
82. Professor Countryman’s definition of executory contract was expressed as follows: “A
contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing performance of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also In re U.S. Wireless Data, Inc., 547 F.3d
484, 488 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Texscan Corp., 976 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992); Cameron
v. Pfaff Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 966 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1992); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l
Fuel Distribution Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989); Collingwood Grain Inc. v. Coast Trading
Inc. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1984).
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company after it exits bankruptcy.83 Debtors typically assume contracts
which are profitable or otherwise provide some necessary benefit to the
company (e.g., a below market rate lease). In contrast, by rejecting a
contract, a company is relieved of all future obligations under the contract,
and all claims arising from the contract are treated as claims arising prior to
the bankruptcy case.84 Debtors typically reject contracts where the debtor’s
obligations are more burdensome than the totality of future benefits (e.g., an
above market supply contract). Whether a debtor could assume or reject an
agreement is generally subject to the debtor’s business judgment.85 The
mere threat of rejection often provides valuable leverage for a debtor to
renegotiate the terms of burdensome executory contracts.
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that codified
§ 1113, the majority of federal circuit courts of appeals agreed that under
the Bankruptcy Code, collective bargaining agreements could be rejected
like any other executory contract. These courts, however, differed over
whether to apply a stricter standard.86 In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the
Supreme Court held that a debtor may reject a collective bargaining
agreement, but that the bankruptcy court should apply a higher standard
than that applied to the rejection of other types of executory contracts.87 The
Court also held that a bankruptcy court should approve rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement if the debtor can demonstrate that the
agreement “burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities
balance in favor of rejecting the contract labor.”88 The Court further ruled
that rejection is appropriate when “reasonable efforts to negotiate a
83. 11 U.S.C. § 365; NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984); see also
Adventure Res. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 1998); Collingwood Grain Inc. v. Coast
Trading Inc. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 692–93 (9th Cir. 1984).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
85. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d
1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311
(5th Cir. 1985); In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 188 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Pilgrim’s
Pride Corp., 403 B.R. 413, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
86. Federal circuit courts of appeals have discussed this issue:
Compare NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1982)
(holding that the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is not qualified by the
restrictions of § 8(d) of the NLRA on modification), aff’d, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), with
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir.
1975) (requiring debtor in possession to show not only that the collective bargaining
agreement is burdensome to the estate, but also that the equities balance in favor of
rejection), and In re Rath Packing Co., 36 B.R. 979, 988 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984)
(stating its “reluctance to accept the rationale for [the] heightened scrutiny” given to the
rejection of labor agreements), aff’d, 48 B.R. 315 (N.D. Iowa 1985).
Mark A. Jacoby, Michael K. Kam & Jose Singer-Freeman, Collective Bargaining Agreements,
Employee Benefits, and Executive Compensation, in 2 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP,
REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES 24-5 n.7 (rev. ed. 2006).
87. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 516, 524.
88. Id. at 526.
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voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce a
prompt and satisfactory solution.” 89
Organized labor lobbied Congress to overturn Bildisco and change the
standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements.90 As a result, in
1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to include a specific
provision that articulated a new, more labor-friendly standard, as well as
procedures, for rejecting collective bargaining agreements; these were
codified in § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1113 sets forth the
exclusive procedures pursuant to which a debtor may reject a collective
bargaining agreement.91 Congress also shifted jurisdiction and oversight
from the National Labor Relations Board to the federal bankruptcy courts.92
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a debtor seek
bankruptcy court approval to reject a collective bargaining agreement.93 To
obtain bankruptcy court approval to reject, the debtor must satisfy certain
requirements.94 Until these requirements are met, the debtor is prohibited
from unilaterally altering any term.95
First, prior to applying to a bankruptcy court for rejection, the debtor
must “make a proposal to the [union], based on the most complete and
reliable information available at the time, . . . which [identifies] those
modifications [to] the employees[’] benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.”96 The proposal must
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 2.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (2006).
Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 24-8.
11 U.S.C. § 1113; see Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 24-6 n.12 (citing
11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2)) (“If the bankruptcy court does not rule on the application for rejection
within thirty days after the ‘date of the commencement of the hearing,’ the debtor may reject or
modify the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling.”).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
95. Id. § 1113(f). If the debtor is able to show that without emergency interim relief from a
collective bargaining agreement the debtor will be required to cease business operations,
§ 1113(e) authorizes such relief. Id. § 1113(e).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A). “[T]he ‘necessary’ requirement has been the subject of
vigorous judicial and academic debate.” Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 24-6
(footnote omitted). In addition,
[c]ourts have questioned whether “necessary” means that the modifications must be
“essential” to the debtor’s business, and to what goal must they be necessary. See Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82[, 88–90] (2d Cir. 1987);
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074[, 1086–
89] (3d Cir. 1986); Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks,
Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884[, 892–97] (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); In re
Tex. Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 265 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); see also 7 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1113.06(2) (Lawrence P. King, Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005); Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 526–34 (1994);
Anne J. McClain, Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEO. L.J. 191[, 206–08]
(1991) (criticizing courts for focusing on necessary requirement); Kay M. Rector,
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assure “that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties [will be]
treated fairly and equitably.”97 The debtor must also provide to the union
“relevant information . . . necessary to evaluate the proposal.”98
Additionally, “[b]etween the time of the making of the proposal and the
time of the hearing on the rejection of the existing collective bargaining
agreement, the debtor must meet and confer with the union in good faith in
an attempt to reach a voluntary settlement.”99
A bankruptcy court may authorize rejection only if the union has
refused to accept the debtor’s proposal without good cause and the balance
of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.100 Although courts differ on what constitutes “good cause,” a
debtor does not need to show bad faith.101 Rather, if a debtor can
demonstrate that a union has rejected a proposal that meets its needs and
preserves the debtor’s required savings, the bankruptcy court may find that
the union has rejected the proposal without “good cause.”102
Section 1113 makes rejection of a collective bargaining agreement an
extraordinarily difficult process. In fact, compliance with § 1113 would be
virtually impossible in the timeframe that would be available in the 363
Transaction. Further, the NLRA requires a purchaser of a business to
negotiate a successor agreement with a union in good faith.103 Given the
precarious nature of GM, it is highly doubtful whether GM could have
survived a prolonged renegotiation process.
2. Retiring Retiree Benefits
Section 1114 similarly shields retiree benefits from modification during
the Chapter 11 process. The Bankruptcy Code defines “retiree benefits” as,

Comment, How Necessary Is “Necessary” Under Section 1113? Truck Drivers Local
807 v. Carey Transportation, 13 J. CORP. L. 941, 947[–]52 (1988).
Id. at 24-6 n.16.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); In re Bruno’s Supermarkets, LLC, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1366
*10–12 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2009); In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984); Nat’l Forge Co. v. Indep. Union of Nat’l Forge Emps. (In re Nat’l Forge Co.), 289
B.R. 803, 809–10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003); In re Elec. Contracting Servs. Co., 305 B.R. 22, 26
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2003); In re Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 341 B.R. 693, 748–49 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2006).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B).
99. Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 24-7.
100. Id. at 24-8.
101. Id.
102. See In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 341–42 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (finding
no “good cause” where the union “ignored the [d]ebtors’ [p]roposals and [did not make] any
efforts to negotiate or provide a counter proposal”); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633,
647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding union did not have “good cause” for refusing proposal for
modifications of collective bargaining agreement where provisions inhibiting debtor’s outsourcing
would be eliminated).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
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payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or
reimbursing payments for retired employees and their spouses and
dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan, fund, or
program . . . maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor
prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this title.104

Pursuant to § 1114(c)(1), a labor organization or union is the
“authorized representative” for those “receiving retiree benefits covered by
a collective bargaining agreement to which such labor organization is a
[party], unless . . . [the union] elects not to serve . . . or the court, upon
motion by any party in interest, . . . determines that different representation
. . . is appropriate.”105 Section 1114(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that if a labor organization elects not to serve as the authorized
representative, the court shall, “upon a motion by any party in interest and
after notice and a hearing, . . . appoint a committee of retired employees [to
represent all such retirees] if the debtor seeks to modify or [terminate]
retiree benefits.”106 To the extent the retiree benefits received are not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court
appoints an authorized representative of the retirees to negotiate with the
debtor.107 A committee created pursuant to § 1114 has “the same rights,
powers, and duties” as creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees
appointed under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code.108
A debtor is required to timely pay and may not modify any retiree
benefits unless the court, on motion of the debtor or the authorized
representative, authorizes modification. These modifications would be
authorized only after certain conditions are met or if the debtor and the
authorized representative agree to such modifications.109 The process for
involuntary modification is similar to the process under § 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Like § 1113, § 1114 effectively ties the hands of Chapter 11 debtors
that need to move expeditiously through the Chapter 11 process. For the
debtor, litigation is often not a prudent course unless survival depends on
the requested modifications.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

11 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2006).
Id. § 1114(c)(1).
Id. § 1114(c)(2).
Id. § 1114(d).
Id. § 1114(b)(2).
Id. § 1114(e), (l).
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3. Negotiating with the UAW
The UAW represented most of GM’s unionized employees.110 It was
also GM’s largest unsecured creditor because of the prior restructuring of
GM’s healthcare obligations through the use of voluntary employee
beneficiary associations (VEBAs) under § 501(c)(9) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.111 Given §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code
and other applicable law, the UAW could have demanded that all claims
arising from their collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefit plans
ride through any GM reorganization unscathed. As a point of reference,
numerous other Chapter 11 debtors have gone through arduous litigation,
only to leave their collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefits
substantially untouched.112
The UAW could have also tapped its considerable political capital to
impose significant pressure for many elected officials, including President
Obama. But, from the beginningincluding the initial December 2008
bridge loanthe U.S. government conditioned any funding on GM coming
to terms with its legacy employee obligations and a reduction of
unnecessary production capacity (i.e., layoffs). The UAW’s collective
bargaining agreement and GM’s retiree benefit plans needed to be recut.

110. Approximately 68 percent of GM’s U.S. unionized employees were represented by the
UAW at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 cases. See Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6,
¶ 23.
111. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
112. The Chapter 11 cases of The Delphi Corporation (Delphi) are an example of the typical
length of negotiations over contract modifications:
Soon after the commencement of the chapter 11 cases, Delphi obtained a scheduling
order setting forth certain requirements of Delphi and its unions [(including the UAW)]
that included the submission of written proposals by Delphi to its unions setting forth
proposed modifications deemed necessary by Delphi to enable its reorganization. It set
a two-month deadline for Delphi to file section 1113 rejection motions if the parties
were unable to achieve a consensual agreement. The parties extended the deadline twice
while they engaged in negotiations as required by section 1113(b)(1). . . . The unions
regularly stated that their members would strike if Delphi obtained court authorization
to reject their respective [collective bargaining agreements] and attempted to impose
modifications to wage rates, work rules, and benefits. . . . After months of negotiations,
Delphi and the [UAW] agreed on an incentive program that would encourage eligible
workers to retire early in exchange for lump sum payments, substantially subsidized by
GM, thereby reducing the ongoing labor force. In an effort to resolve remaining issues,
Delphi filed its section 1113 rejection motion. . . . In the face of persistent and caustic
comments by union leaders that their membership would strike if Delphi attempted to
impose modifications of the [collective bargaining agreement] postrejection, Delphi
indefinitely adjourned the prosecution of the rejection motions. Negotiations resumed
with the unions with GM’s participation. Almost one year later, Delphi and the UAW,
the principal representative of Delphi’s organized employees, agreed to amendments of
its [collective bargaining agreement].
Harvey R. Miller et al., The State of the Unions in Reorganization and Restructuring Cases, 15
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 465, 493–94 (2007).
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Plants needed to be closed. The UAW and its members would need to share
in the sacrifice.
While some critics may argue that the UAW got a “sweetheart” deal,
the UAW did make significant concessions, including, among other things,
reductions in overtime pay, bonuses, and benefits.113 The UAW also created
greater competitive flexibility for GM to increase and decrease production
capacity as necessary by permitting temporary flex employees, suspending
the job security program, and creating new special attrition plans to reduce
head count.114 A number of retiree benefits were also reduced or
eliminated.115 In light of the aforementioned legal constraints and the
required timing of the transaction, any suggestion that the deal for the UAW
was too rich should be leveled at the UAW and not the U.S. government
that was operating within the confines of the applicable law.
C. A NEED FOR SPEED?
[A] lengthy chapter 11 case for the Debtors is not an option. . . . In fact, the
notion that a reorganization with a plan confirmation could be completed in 90
days in a case of this size and complexity is ludicrous . . .
Hon. Robert E. Gerber116

Another concern raised about the GM bankruptcy process was the hasty
nature of the 363 Transaction, which potentially sacrificed creditors’ rights
in the process. The critics would argue that a transaction of this magnitude
should only be conducted under a plan of reorganization where creditors
have the right to challenge the impact of the proposed transaction on the
treatment of their individual claims.
Several factors, including the lack of additional financing and the
concern over erosion in value, however, dictated the timing of the
transaction. In fact, such timing is in line with other emergency sales under
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.117 Had any credible party expressed an
interest in funding an alternative transaction, the Bankruptcy Court may
have put the brakes on, if at all possible. It is worth noting that just thirty
days prior to the GM Chapter 11 case, Chrysler, one of the other “Big

113. Declaration of David Curson, Ex. A, at 2, 8–9 (ECF No. 2518) (UAW General Motors –
Modifications to 2007 Agreement and Addendum to VEBA Agreement).
114. Id. at 2, 3, 8.
115. Id. at 11–14.
116. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 485.
117. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 407 B.R. 77, 80, 82, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(affirming bankruptcy court’s approval of sale of debtors’ investment banking business three days
after the filing of sale motion); see also In re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC, 405 B.R. 68, 71–72
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving sale of debtors’ entire retail business forty-four days after
filing); In re Refco, Inc., 354 B.R. 515, 517 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (approving sale of regulated
commodities futures merchant bank twenty-eight days after commencement of bankruptcy case).
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Three,” had undergone substantially the same process—a sale of all
operating assets under a very tight deadline.118
1. The Bankruptcy Sales Process
A debtor may sell substantially all of its assets pursuant to § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code or through a Chapter 11 plan. A Chapter 11 plan,
however, requires substantially more time to approve and implement.
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to sell assets
outside the ordinary course of business upon notice and a hearing. While
the plain language of § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code appears to provide a
debtor with the unfettered right to dispose of any or all of its assets, courts
have required that the decision to sell assets outside the ordinary course of
business be based on the debtor’s “reasonable business judgment.”119 Such
sales can be of individual items or substantially all of a debtor’s assets.
Although for the latter to be permitted, there must be an articulated reason
not to conduct the sale through a plan, such as in the case where the assets
are perishable or constitute “melting ice cubes.”120 To demonstrate sound
business judgment, courts typically require a debtor to market the asset to
obtain the highest and best offer to maximize the proceeds from the sale for
the benefit of creditors and all parties in interest.
A sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets can be subject to attack on
the basis that it constitutes an impermissible sub rosa plan. The term sub
rosa is generally used in this context to describe a post-petition, pre118. In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 92–93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 2009
U.S. App. LEXIS 12351 (2d Cir. June 5, 2009) (summary order) and 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)
(supplementary opinion), vacated as moot, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC
(Chrysler II), 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009). Although the judgment recorded at Chrysler I has
been vacated, the Court’s rationale in Chrysler I remains persuasive and should arguably be given
stare decisis effect. See, for example, Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Davis v. Cty. of Los
Angeles:
Although a decision vacating a judgment necessarily prevents the opinion of the lower
court from being the law of the case, the expressions of the court below on the merits, if
not reversed, will continue to have precedential weight and, until contrary authority is
decided, are likely to be viewed as persuasive authority if not the governing law of
[that] Circuit.
440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722 F.2d
1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that “there must be some articulated business justification,
other than appeasement of major creditors, for using, selling or leasing property out of the
ordinary course of business”); Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that in the Second Circuit, a
363(b) sale is permissible if the judge finds that there is sufficient evidence that there is a good
business reason for the sale); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the bankruptcy court’s decision that an “articulated business reason justified the sale”
of the debtor’s radio station); In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R. 169, 175–76 (D. Del. 1991)
(noting that the courts in the Third Circuit have adopted the sound business purpose test).
120. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
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confirmation transaction outside the ordinary course of business which
allocates value to specific creditors, a process that is more appropriately
implemented pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan.121 A sale of substantially all of
a debtor’s assets under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is permitted where
the assets are perishable, provided that the debtor is free to allocate sale
proceeds as it sees fit under a subsequently filed Chapter 11 plan.
Nevertheless, although pursuant to § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code a
purchaser is free to assume whatever liabilities it chooses, it cannot
designate how different creditors or equity holders will be treated in a
debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.122
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re
Braniff Airways, Inc.), a proposed sale contemplated certain agreements
between Braniff, the debtor, and a group consisting of certain unsecured
and secured creditors of Braniff, and the transfer of certain assets to Pacific
Southwest Airlines (PSA), in exchange for travel vouchers, unsecured
notes, and a profit participation in PSA’s proposed operation of the assets
(the PSA Agreement). Both the bankruptcy court and the district court had
approved the transaction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
transaction was beyond the scope permitted by § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code and had established the terms of a plan of reorganization sub rosa.
The Braniff court was most troubled by a provision within the PSA
Agreement requiring that the travel vouchers be used only in a future
Braniff reorganization, and be issued only to former Braniff employees,
shareholders, or unsecured creditors. According to the Braniff court, the
PSA Agreement not only changed the composition of Braniff’s assets, but
had the practical effect of dictating the terms of any future reorganization
plan by requiring allocation of the vouchers according to the PSA
Agreement, at the risk of forfeiting a valuable asset.123 The Braniff court
was also troubled by a provision in the PSA Agreement requiring “secured
creditors to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of any future
reorganization plan approved by a majority of the unsecured creditor’s
committee [and a provision providing] for the release of claims by all
parties against Braniff, its secured creditors, and its officers and
directors.”124 In essence, the sale proposed in Braniff would have: (1)

121. See Craig A. Sloane, Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 37–38 (1999).
122. Chrysler I, 576 F.3d at 126 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale over
objections that a sale free and clear of any interests should not include successor liability claims
explaining that the “possibility of transferring assets free and clear of existing tort liability was a
critical inducement to the [s]ale”); see also Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc.
(In re Smart World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 169 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Section 363 permits
sales of assets free and clear of claims and interests. It thus allows purchasers . . . to acquire assets
without any accompanying liabilities.”).
123. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939–40.
124. Id.
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controlled distributions in a future plan of reorganization; (2) obligated
secured creditors to vote for such plan; and (3) released claims of all parties
against the debtors, its officers and directors, and the secured creditors. The
Braniff court held that when a proposed sale transaction dictates specific
terms of an ensuing reorganization plan, “the parties . . . must scale the
hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”125 The Braniff court concluded that, were
the transaction approved, little would remain for further reorganization:
“These considerations reinforce our view that this is in fact a
reorganization,” and not a mere asset sale within the confines of § 363(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code.126
The tension between the broad authority granted to a debtor in § 363(b),
and the rigorous solicitation and approval process of a Chapter 11 plan, has
been a source of significant debate, most vociferously when the sale
involves substantially all of a debtor’s assets. Most courts to consider the
issue have concluded that a debtor may dispose of substantially all of its
assets pursuant to § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code when circumstances
dictate an expeditious transaction.127 Courts typically apply stricter scrutiny
to a sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets because this type of
transaction may provide an attractive opportunity to circumvent the
protections that the Bankruptcy Code provides for reorganizations.128
2. Expediency of the 363 Transaction
As GM’s largest secured creditor, the U.S. government129 dedicated
substantial time and effort to negotiating with the debtors to preserve the
going-concern value of the GM enterprise. Surveys taken prior to the GM
bankruptcy showed that consumers needed to have confidence in GM’s
products (i.e., that a GM would exist in the future that would stand behind
its products).130 Both GM and the U.S. Treasury were well aware that
consumers would hesitate when purchasing cars and trucks from a bankrupt
company, and that the longer GM was in bankruptcy, the more significant
the potential for erosion of the value of its assets. GM’s assets were fragile
and a quick § 363(b) sale was not only warranted, but necessary to preserve

125. Id. at 940 (“See e.g.[,] 11 U.S.C. § 1125 [(2006)] (disclosure requirements); id. § 1126
(voting); id. § 1129(a)(7) (best interests of creditors test); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (absolute priority
rule).”).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 43
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Where a debtor attempts to sell substantially all of its assets pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 363(b), instead of waiting for confirmation of a reorganization plan and the safeguards
that that process provides, more than cursory scrutiny is required by the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt.”).
128. See In re New Hampshire Elec. Coop., Inc., 131 B.R. 249, 252 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)
(“[T]he closer the transaction gets to the heart of the reorganization process, the more scrutiny the
[c]ourt has to give that matter.”).
129. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
130. Viability Plan II, supra note 33, at 36, 103, 112–17.
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the going-concern value of GM. In fact, the linchpin for the sale hearing
before the Bankruptcy Court was the uncontroverted testimony that any
delay in the § 363 sale would result in continuing and increasing revenue
erosion and further loss of market share to other domestic and foreign
manufacturers that were not suffering aggravated financial distress.131
After a three-day hearing, with more than 850 objections having been
filed and addressed, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to New GM on
July 5, 2009. The Bankruptcy Court found that absent an immediate sale, it
was highly probable that GM would have to liquidate.132 There were no
other realistic alternatives available. There were no merger partners,
acquirers, or investors willing and able to purchase GM’s business. Other
than the U.S. Treasury and the Canadian EDC, there were no lenders
willing and able to finance the debtor’s continued operations. The
Bankruptcy Court further found that no debtor-in-possession financing was
available in the absence of the 363 Transaction.133 No entity—other than the
U.S. Treasury—had the wherewithal or the inclination to provide such
financing.134
The sub rosa argument had been articulated by several creditors,
principally bondholders. In the end, GM was able to establish that the sale
transaction did not dictate the terms of a plan of reorganization and that the
estate’s portion of the sale consideration was unencumbered from any
contractual condition or requirement. The Bankruptcy Court observed:
[A] debtor cannot enter into a transaction that would amount to a sub rosa
plan of reorganization or an attempt to circumvent the chapter 11
requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization. If, however, the
transaction has a proper business justification which has the potential to

131. The Court noted:
Observers might differ as to the causes or opine that there were others as well, and
might differ especially with respect to which causes were most important. But what is
clear is that, especially in 2008 and 2009, GM suffered a steep erosion in revenues,
significant operating losses, and a dramatic loss of liquidity, putting its future in grave
jeopardy.
In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
132. The Court stated:
As nobody can seriously dispute, the only alternative to an immediate sale is
liquidation—a disastrous result for GM’s creditors, its employees, the suppliers who
depend on GM for their own existence, and the communities in which GM operates. In
the event of a liquidation, creditors now trying to increase their incremental recoveries
would get nothing.
Id. at 474.
133. See id. at 491–92 (“If the 363 Transaction [was] disapproved, GM [would have lost] its
funding and its liquidity . . . and its only alternative [would have been] liquidation.”).
134. Id. at 480.
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lead toward confirmation of a plan and is not to evade the plan
confirmation process, the transaction may be authorized.135

As to the contention that the 363 Transaction was a sub rosa plan because
the Purchaser was allowed to “cherry-pick” certain liabilities for
assumption, and failed to provide consideration to all of GM’s stakeholders,
the court noted that “that does not rise to the level of establishing a sub rosa
plan. The objectors’ real problem is with the decisions of the [p]urchaser,
not with the [d]ebtor[s], nor with any violation of the [Bankruptcy] Code or
caselaw.”136
The Bankruptcy Court was not persuaded by arguments that the sale of
substantially all of the debtor’s assets could only be achieved under a
Chapter 11 plan. The Bankruptcy Court noted that § 363(b)
does not provide, in words or substance, that it may not be used in chapter
11 cases for dispositions of property exceeding any particular size, or
where the property is of such importance that it should alternatively be
disposed of under a plan. Nor does any other provision of the
[Bankruptcy] Code so provide.137

D. TRANSPARENCY IN THE PROCESS
An underappreciated aspect of the GM Chapter 11 cases is the stark
transparency of the entire process. All aspects of GM’s Chapter 11 cases,
including the 363 Transaction, were subject to notice and an opportunity to
be heard by a neutral third-party tribunal (i.e., the Bankruptcy Court). As
with many other time sensitive matters in the Bankruptcy Court, so was
substantial discovery on an expedited basis (both document production and
depositions) made available to opponents of the 363 Transaction.138 The
bankruptcy process also provided opposing parties a means to appeal if they
believed that the Bankruptcy Court erred. Several appeals of the order
approving the 363 Transaction were in fact brought.139 The entire process
was a matter of public record and was subject to public review.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 486.
See Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65, 73–74
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 10-4882-bk, doc. 90 (2d Cir. July 28, 2011), cert.
denied, 2012 WL 33339 (Jan. 9, 2011) (affirming the 363 Transaction over objection of a
purported GM bondholder and rejecting appellant’s argument that the speed of the 363
Transaction violated his due process rights because the record showed that over a period of ten
days, GM provided full and prompt discovery to every party that requested it, including
appellant).
139. Appeals were filed by various parties including one of GM’s labor unions, the IUE-CWA,
an ad hoc committee of asbestos claimants, a group of product liability tort claimants, and certain
pro se bondholders. See, e.g., Notice of Appeal of Order Authorizing the Sale of Assets Pursuant
to the Master Sale and Purchase Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC (ECF No.
2988); Joinder of Mark Buttita, as Personal Representative of Salvatore Buttita, to the Ad Hoc
Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants’ Motion for an Order Certifying Sale Order for
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Although some might criticize the expedited nature of the 363
Transaction, opposing parties still voiced their opposition in a meaningful
manner, and the Bankruptcy Court held hearings over three days to consider
such opposition. Parties filed over 850 objections and responses to the 363
Transaction that are now part of the public record of the cases. The
transcript for the hearing to approve the 363 Transaction is over 1,200
pages. Most importantly, nothing prohibited any party from proposing an
alternative to the 363 Transaction or the financing provided by the U.S.
Treasury and Canadian EDC, on which the 363 Transaction was
predicated.140 Had an alternative been proposed, GM would have had a
fiduciary obligation to consider such proposal; and, if such proposal
provided a more meaningful recovery to creditors, GM would likely have
been obligated to pursue such proposal if it were possible.
The Bankruptcy Code also provides a predetermined framework for
creditors’ rights. This framework, including priority schemes for allocation
of value to creditors and equity holders, is a critical element of
transparency. Transparency is illusory if there is no predictability and
parties cannot assess whether the transaction is fundamentally fair and
consistent with traditional norms.
Some critics have suggested that certain creditors, such as products
liability tort victims, should receive preferential treatment because of the
disproportional “pain” suffered by such creditors.141 The argument is that,
unlike bondholders, tort claimants did not extend credit to GM and did not
voluntarily agree that they could be injured. Since the Bankruptcy Code
makes clear that no such priority exists in the Chapter 11 context, counsel
for claimants have been accepting of the treatment afforded to their clients.
Through the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has already determined which
creditors are entitled to priority and in the absence of congressional
amendment to the Code, parties have an expectation of where they must
stand.
If the U.S. government were to nationalize GM and devise a
restructuring or forced sale on its own without a pre-established distribution
scheme such as those set out in the Bankruptcy Code, these types of
arguments would stand on firmer ground. Moreover, a lack of transparency
would engender creditor frustration.

Immediate Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(D)(2) or in
the Alternative for a Stay of the Sale Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005 (ECF No. 3013);
Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 3060); Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 3115); Notice of Appeal (ECF No.
3265).
140. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36, ¶ 11; Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 14–15.
141. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 2.
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III. IMPROVING THE PROCESS
In retrospect, the GM bankruptcy appears to be an overwhelming
success. GM has positioned itself again as a strong contender in the
automotive sector. Hundreds of thousands of jobs were preserved and
billions of dollars of enterprise value maintained. But a sale pursuant to
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is not the answer for government
intervention in all “too big to fail” restructurings. Every restructuring
generates different considerations. In addition to sales pursuant to § 363, the
Bankruptcy Code provides various other tools that may make Chapter 11 a
viable alternative for future government assistance of systemically
significant companies.
To prepare for the next restructuring cycle, it may make sense for
Congress to analyze lessons learned from the automotive restructurings to
determine if reforms to the Bankruptcy Code are warranted or desirable.
While the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the Dodd-Frank Act)142 has provided an alternative means of
addressing the insolvency of systemically important financial institutions,
the lack of transparency and predictability of a government takeover under
the Dodd-Frank Act is less than ideal.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act provides a means for the U.S.
government to provide bridge financing to a distressed company, it strips
many of the safeguards and protections provided by the bankruptcy process.
In the first instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
the U.S. Federal Reserve effectively have exclusive jurisdiction to
determine how a financial institution will be liquidated or recapitalized. The
FDIC and Federal Reserve also would have the unilateral ability to
determine how value is monetized and how collateral of secured creditors is
valued for purposes of distributions. There would be no judicial oversight
or forum to address individual creditor disputes. While Chapter 11 is not a
perfect solution, it provides the checks and balances that insulate the U.S.
government from allegations that they have acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
A. MAKING NATIONAL INTERESTS A FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION
The Bankruptcy Code143 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure144 generally dictate the parties that have standing in a bankruptcy
case. Entities that are neither creditors nor equity holders may be affected
substantially by the outcome of a case, yet the bankruptcy court is not
empowered to consider their interests. This typically makes perfect sense
because the goals of Chapter 11 are to promote a fresh start for the debtor
142. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006).
144. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018, 7024.
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and maximize value for creditors and equity holders. In the context of a
debtor that is deemed “too big to fail,” however, the national interest may
be paramount to creditor recoveries.
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code could be considered to provide
the U.S. government with standing to promote the national interest in
appropriate and limited circumstances. The bankruptcy court could likewise
be empowered to consider the national interest in approving or
disapproving of transactions out of the ordinary course of business.
This would permit the bankruptcy court to consider matters beyond the
scope of the interest of creditors. For example, assume two alternative
transactions were pending before the bankruptcy court. Transaction A
would provide for recoveries to creditors of approximately fifty cents on the
dollar but would require the immediate shutdown of certain operations
critical to the economy as a whole. On the other hand, Transaction B would
provide recoveries of approximately forty-five cents on the dollar but would
provide a more orderly wind-down of certain operations that would
minimize the overall impact of the transaction. Under the current
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor would be duty bound to select Transaction A
over Transaction B even though the impact on the country could be
catastrophic. What constitutes the “public good” may be subject to much
debate, but should not the court at least have an opportunity to consider it?
Such a public interest standard is not without precedent. For example,
§ 1165 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs railroad reorganizations,
provides that in applying the provisions governing railroad reorganizations,
the court and the trustee “shall consider the public interest in addition to the
interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders.”145 A similar
provision could be enacted for systemically important institutions.
Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code currently provides that “a
party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an
equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or
any indenture trustee, may raise or may appear to be heard on any issue in a
case under this chapter.”146 In recognition of the “public interest,” § 1109 of
the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to grant an appropriate regulatory
agency standing to participate in the Chapter 11 case of a systemically
important institution. These amendments could go so far as to divest a
Chapter 11 debtor of its exclusive rights to control its Chapter 11 case and
the plan process by allowing a regulatory agency, such as the FDIC, to seek
the appointment of a receiver within the Chapter 11 cases or to seek leave
of the bankruptcy court to terminate exclusivity and propose its own

145. 11 U.S.C. § 1165.
146. Id. § 1109(b).
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Chapter 11 plan that otherwise complies with the requirements of § 1129 of
the Bankruptcy Code.147
B. REVIEW OF PRIORITIES SCHEME
Though Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide priority
treatment to additional creditor constituencies, each exception to the equal
sharing of pain among similarly situated creditors undermines the
overarching purpose of the bankruptcy process to permit a company to
rehabilitate, reorganize, and recover while providing for an equitable
distribution of value. The Bankruptcy Code is already replete with special
interest exceptions which hamper a company’s ability to reorganize.148
The plight of product liability victims in the GM case, for example, is
not an indication of a need to alter the priority scheme for such claims. The
root of the issue was the lack of third-party insurance except for the largest
of claims. The problem would be better solved by monitoring the health of
companies self-insuring risk rather than by altering the priority scheme for
certain claimants. In any event, these issues are worthy of debate so long as
the loudest voices are not controlled by special interest groups.
CONCLUSION
The restructuring of GM was historic not only in the importance of the
rescue to the stabilization of the U.S. economy but also for the U.S.
government’s innovative use of the Bankruptcy Code to implement an
emergency sale of the operating assets while leaving behind the non-core
assets and most liabilities. As with any government action, there were
supporters and detractors. Some critics have argued that certain creditor
constituencies did not receive sufficient recoveries, yet additional
recoveries would have resulted in greater expenditures of taxpayer dollars.
Others, of course, have criticized the use of taxpayer dollars in the first
instance; yet liquidation would have eliminated the possibility that
unsecured creditors would receive any distributions, multiplying the pain
felt by individual creditors and having an even worse effect on the national
budget. Liquidation could have exacted an even greater toll on taxpayers
through the result of lost jobs, decreased tax revenues, and increased
expenditures on unemployment assistance, healthcare, and environmental
remediation.
Overall, the process worked. Had the U.S. Treasury attempted to
implement a restructuring without the transparency of bankruptcy court
oversight, the public outcry would have been thunderous. The likely
outcome would have been that the U.S. Treasury would have had expended
multiples of what it ultimately did in an effort to keep GM afloat and allow
147. Id. § 1129.
148. See, e.g., id. § 362(b)(1)–(28).
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the company to honor all of its obligations. Alternatively, the U.S. Treasury
would have had to engineer some form of nationalization by fiat where the
form of consideration ultimately paid to creditors certainly would be
challenged as arbitrary and unconstitutional.
In response to the last financial crisis, the U.S. government has spent
significant resources developing procedures for winding down systemically
significant financial institutions while minimizing the impact on the global
economy. Winding down a company like GM, however, is not a realistic
option. Given the success of the 363 Transaction, Congress should evaluate
whether modifications to the Bankruptcy Code are appropriate to ensure
that in future financial crises, the United States could effectively utilize the
Bankruptcy Code to rescue systemically significant companies with
nowhere else to turn.

